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This note examines the relationship between public expenditure growth and
tax base elasticity in the context of the median voter model. If the revenue
elasticity of the tax base and the median voter’s income elasticity of demand
for public services are not identical, the automatic increase in public revenue
resulting from an increase in voter income will not match the median voter’s
increase in demand for public service expenditures. If adjusting tax rates is
costly, the short-run rate of growth ofpublic expenditures will be biased in the
direction of the automatic growth in tax revenue rather than being tied directly
to changes in the median voter’s demand for public services. The welfare loss
occasioned by these positive decision-making costs can be reduced by choosing
that tax base for which revenue elasticity most closely corresponds to income
elasticity and also by evaluating tax rates in a multiperiod context at the time
they are imposed.
The hypothesis has been advanced that the rate of growthof public expenditures in a political jurisdiction will be
positively correlated with the revenue elasticity of that juris-
diction’s tax base (Buchanan, 1969; Wagner, 1971). Recent work
by Oates (1975) has given empirical support to the idea. Such an
effect would seem contrary to the median voter model commonly
employed in public choice analysis. This model predicts that as
personal incomes in a jurisdiction expand or decline, changes in
public expenditure levels will reflect the media voter’s income
elasticity of demand for public services, not the revenue elasticity
of the tax base, except in the case that the two are identical.
An explanation for the role of revenue elasticity in deter-
mining public sector growth emerges when one considers the
costs of political decision-making, of which those associated with
changing tax rates are probably among the highest. Even if the
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revenue elasticity of the tax base does not correspond per-
fectly to the median voter’s income elasticity, tax rates may
not be adjusted immediately in response to changing voter
incomes if such adjustment is sufficiently costly that voters
and the politicians who seek their support find it worthwhile to
limit its frequency. This does not imply, of course, that the tax
rates will never be adjusted. If voter income consistently increases
(or decreases) and along with it the divergence between the actual
public sector size and that preferred by the median voter, an
eventual change in the tax rate can be predicted to occur. In the
short run, however, the rate of growth of public expenditures
will be biased in the direction of the rate of growth of revenue
yielded by the tax base with unchanging rates rather than being
tied directly to changes in the median voter’s demand for public
services.
The existence of this bias does not suggest that the tax insti-
tution is inefficient in any real sense. Rather, voters find it pref-
erable to live with that bias rather than bear the costs and uncer-
tainty of continually reexamining tax rates. In addition, both the
choice of tax base and the choice of rates to be imposed on that
base provide a potential means of reducing the welfare loss
occasioned by the existence of positive decision-making costs.
For example, in the absence of any tax base which is charac-
terized by perfect correspondence between its revenue flexibility
and the median voter’s preferred income consumption path, that
base which yields the income consumption pattern most closely
approximating the median voter’s preferred pattern has two
advantages. First, it minimizes the divergence at any given time
between the actual level of public expenditures and that which
would be chosen if political decision-making were a costless pro-
cess. By reducing the severity of the disequilibrium, an additional
gain from utilizing such a tax base is that it minimizes the fre-
quency with which the costs of adjusting tax rates will actually be
incurred.
Given that voters perceive that tax rates will be adjusted with
relative infrequency, revenue elasticity will be an important
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factor affecting the choice among alternative tax bases. Interest-
ingly, unless voters are certain about their own relative positions
with respect to public goods demand, i.e., high, median, or low,
the political process will not necessarily yield the &dquo;correct&dquo;
choice of tax base. To clarify, consider the following example.
Suppose that two tax bases are being considered for adoption;
they yield the same distribution of tax shares, but they have dif-
fering revenue elasticities. If each voter believes that he will be
the median voter with respect to tax rates, each will vote for the
tax for which revenue elasticity most closely approximates his
own income elasticity. Because of differing income elasticities
among voters, the actual median voter may not be in the majority
with respect to choice of tax base.
Given the choice of tax base, voter preferences with respect to
tax rates will be affected by the perception that rates, once set, will
prevail for several budgetary periods. A voter’s preferred tax rate
will be affected by the revenue elasticity of the tax base and will
differ from that rate which would be preferred if only a single
budgetary period was affected. At the time tax rates are decided
upon in a growing economy, a voter will prefer a lower tax rate
than his single period optimum if the revenue elasticity of the
tax base exceeds his income elasticity of demand, and a higher
rate than his single period optimum if revenue elasticity falls
below income elasticity.
The choice of tax rate is clearly made under uncertainty,
because the voter does not know the number of periods for which
the rates being determined will prevail. However, a simple model
which abstracts from the uncertainty problem can clarify how
preferred tax rates are affected by the fact that they are evaluated
in a multiperiod rather than a single period context. Suppose that
a decision is to be made during an initial budgetary period on tax
rates which will, once chosen, prevail for that period and the
following two. Designate the tax price of the public good, q, con-
fronting an individual as t and the price of the private good, x, as
p. These prices are assumed to be invariant during the three
budgetary periods. The income of the voter during the i‘h period,
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016pfr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
[308]
i = 0, 1, 2 is designated as Y,. The voter’s income is assumed to
grow at a constant, proportionate rate, Q, which is also the
proportionate rate of growth in aggregate income. If the price of q
does not change as income increases, and if the revenue elasticity
of the tax base is 6, then
The voter chooses qo (and implicitly the tax rate) not to maximize
utility during period 0, but rather to maximize the present value
of the sum of utilities attained during periods 0, 1 and 2. The
conditions for a maximum can be derived using the following
Lagrangian:
The necessary condition for a maximum is:
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The necessary condition for maximizing utility during any single
period is, of course:
rl11
Thus, it can be seen that the voter will prefer setting tax rates
such that utility during the initial period is maximized only if the
income-consumption path yielded by the tax base corresponds
exactly to the voter’s own income-consumption curve.
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